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RACE-ING LEGAL ETHICS
Anthony V. Alfieri*
Last year I began work on a long-term project studying the historical
intersection of race, lawyers, and ethics in the context of the American
criminal justice system. Informed by the jurisprudential movement of
Critical Race Theory (CRT),' the project investigates the rhetoric of race
or "race-talk" in criminal defense advocacy and ethics dealing with ra-
cially motivated acts of private violence. The first part of this ongoing
project, inaugurated in the recent essay "Defending Racial Violence,"2
explores the rhetoric of race in cases of black-on-white violence. The sec-
ond part, now in progress, examines such rhetoric in cases of white-on-
black violence, specifically in the context of lynching. A third part, soon
to be commenced, will survey the rhetoric of race in cases of racially moti-
vated acts of public violence.
In search of a starting point for this larger, multipronged project, I
turned to the 1993 trial of Damian Williams and Henry Watson in Los
Angeles County Superior Court on charges of attempted murder and ag-
gravated mayhem arising out of the beating of Reginald Denny and seven
others during the South Central Los Angeles riots of April 1992. To win
acquittals, the Williams-Watson defense teams refuted evidence of intent
and voluntary conduct required to prove criminal liability for murder and
mayhem. The defense relied on a "group contagion" theory of mob vio-
lence-incited diminished capacity. Invoked as a partially exculpatory de-
fense, the theory suggests that young black males as a group, and the
black community as a whole, share a pathological tendency to commit
acts of violence in mob situations and, by extension, in other social situa-
tions.3 Both Williams and Watson are young, male, and black. Denny is
white.
The troubling conjunction of race, racialized defense strategy, and
purportedly race-neutral ethics in the context of the Williams-Watson
trial prodded me to develop tentative, working hypotheses regarding the
rhetoric of race in criminal defense advocacy. In "Interracial Violence
and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the Road Less Traveled,"4 Robin
Barnes challenges these descriptive and prescriptive hypotheses. Because
Barnes's critique implicates issues vital to the application of Critical Race
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of
Miami School of Law. A.B., Brown University, 1981; J.D., Columbia University School of
Law, 1984.
1. For a helpful overview of the jurisprudential elements constituting CRT, see
Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); Symposium, Critical
Race Theory, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 741 (1994).
2. Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1801 (1995).
3. See id. at 1311.
4. Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the
Road Less Traveled, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 788 (1996).
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Theory to practice, I Will first clarify the challenged hypotheses and then
meet her objections.
In "Defending Racial Violence," I observed that the rhetorical struc-
ture of criminal defense stories of black-on-white racial violence reflects
the dissonance of competing narratives of deviance and defiance that
construct the identity of young black males in terms of both bestial pathol-
ogy and insurrectionist rage.5 That dissonance produces racialized narra-
tives of "good" and "bad" young black men, thus reducing racial identity
to an essentialist dichotomy of good/bad moral character.6 Distilling the
complex, multilayered experience of young black males into two univer-
sal and objective categories of essential black manhood distorts the mean-
ing of racial identity and the image of racial community.
7
Contemporary rules of legal ethics, I explained, condone this distor-
tion by approving racialized or color-coded criminal defense strategies
under neutral accounts of liberal contractarian and communitarian legal
theory.s The contractarian account treats deviance-based racialized strat-
egies as the rational and voluntary maneuvers of an autonomous client.
The communitarian account addresses the same strategies as the product
of lawyer-client deliberation and dialogue.
Despite the allure of liberal theory, I assailed the presumption com-
mon to each account that a client might freely adopt a self-subordinating
narrative of racial deviance. 9 That presumption, I pointed out, overlooks
the constraints of laws (procedural and substantive), legal institutions
(courts and prisons), and legal actors (prosecutors and police) impinging
upon a criminal client's decisionmaking. 10 Those constraints, coupled
with a client's interests in liberty and survival, give rise to a more limited
conception of voluntary client action. This weakened conception com-
mands less deference under contractarian and communitarian doctrine,
thereby leaving room for a lawyer's discretionary moral counseling.
Moreover, I noted that the presumption of willful self-subordination
omits the potential harm to the dignitary and community interests of a
client." Such harm disturbs the logic of elevating a client's liberty and
survival interests over the competing values of dignity and community
and, hence, diminishes the notion of rational client self-subordination.
This notion erodes because dignity and community form the moral un-
derpinnings of liberty. Abating dignity or community curtails liberty, les-
sening the rationality of self-subordination. Attenuation of this sort does
5. See Alfieri, supra note 2, at 1304.
6. See id. at 1309.
7. Cf. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L.
Rev. 581, 585-86 (1990) (describing experience of racial essentialism in context of black
women).
8. See Alfieri, supra note 2, at 1320.
9. See id. at 1324-25.
10. See id. at 1311, 1322.
11. See id. at 1323-25.
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not, of course, necessarily render self-subordination irrational. A client
may view it as a means to achieve a short-term interest, namely acquittal.
It remains to be seen whether a lawyer and client can reach such a judg-
ment in a consensual and fully-informed manner.
To engage the issues of racial essentialism and self-subordination,
dignitary and community harm, and color-blind deliberation in criminal
defense advocacy and ethics, I proposed an alternative ethic of profes-
sional responsibility based on principles of race consciousness, contin-
gency, and collectivity.12 The principle of race consciousness posits race
and racial difference as central to a client's identity and decisionmaking
process. The principle of contingency holds that a client's moral charac-
ter and life choices derive, in part, from sources outside the self, includ-
ing law and community. The principle of collectivity enjoins lawyers and
clients to acceptjoint responsibility for harm to third party or community
interests.
Two rule-based approaches accommodate this cluster of alternative
principles. A strong version urges criminal defense lawyers to forego uni-
laterally the use of deviance-based racialized strategies, except to en-
courage the ad hocjury nullification of a racially discriminatory prosecu-
tion.13 A weak version prescribes lawyer-client deliberations of racial
identity and injury within a counseling dialogue devoted to considera-
tions of moral character and community integrity. Character dialogue
assesses the incompatibility of deviance narratives with client authenticity
and dignity. Community dialogue considers the client obligation to up-
hold the integrity and to promote the respect of racial communities.
Barnes claims that the alternative ethic of race-conscious responsibil-
ity fails to recognize that race-based narratives of "white defiance" provide
the most significant source of harm to individual and collective black
identity.14 The harm flows from public attempts to exculpate racially mo-
tivated acts of white-on-black violence, especially in "high-profile" crimi-
nal trials.15 For Barnes, the failure to appreciate this harm signals a mis-
apprehension of the social construction and discourse of race.16 In her
view, deviance-based racialized criminal defense strategies merely "re-
flect" the dominant racial discourse in American society. 17 According to
12. See id. at 1340.
13. The nullification proviso follows established mechanisms governing the allocation
of burdens and the order of proof in cases of discriminatory employment and jury
selection. The mechanisms require evidence of discrimination to be refuted by a neutral
explanation of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Under this framework, it is the
criminal defense counsel's burden to produce evidence of prosecutorial racial
discrimination. Once this burden is met, the burden of production shifts to the
prosecution to establish a neutral explanation for the indictment. Establishing a neutral
predicate shifts the burden back to the defense for rebuttal evidence of pretext.
14. See Barnes, supra note 4, at 791-92.
15. See id.




this view, defiance-based racialized narratives must similarly "reflect" the
reigning racial discourse. This inference is mistaken. Defiance narratives
deviate from dominant racial discourse. Barnes overlooks this deviation,
misconceiving the tensions in the sociolegal discourse of race and misstat-
ing the individual and community harm arising out of those tensions.
Barnes's explication of racialized defense strategies mistakes the
whole purpose of the alternative ethic of race-conscious responsibility.
The goal of the ethic is to establish the principle of lawyer moral account-
ability for racial harm done to the character of individual clients and to
the integrity of third parties or communities. At present, codes of ethics
permit lawyers to maintain a color-blind stance of nonaccountability in
appraising the moral consequences of their advocacy for law, legal institu-
tions, clients, and third parties. This stance not only trivializes, but si-
lences, racial injury.
Barnes departs from this stance, conceding the harm of black devi-
ance narratives, only to override it with purported evidence of the greater
harm of white defiance narratives. 18 This override implies that racial
harm is susceptible to empirical measurement and ordering. Barnes in
fact differentiates between discrete categories of harm and arranges them
in white/black and social/legal hierarchies. According to this hierarchi-
cal logic, white narratives dominate black voices and social discourse gov-
erns legal rhetoric. Although Barnes finds this logic compelling, she de-
nies that it is natural or necessary, citing political and economic means of
change.' 9 Yet, she detects no room for change in the settled principle of
lawyer moral nonaccountability, proclaiming it necessary.
20
The admission of client racial injury, however, demands lawyer
moral accountability. The historical legitimacy of the principle of nonac-
countability hinges on the pretext of race-neutrality. Evidence that racial-
ized strategies mar the dignity of "individual personalities" and deform
the integrity of "collective" racial histories shatters this pretext.2 1 Like-
wise, evidence of historically intertwined racial narratives and sociolegal
discourses explodes the hierarchies of white/black narrative and social/
legal discourse. Barnes overcomes these evidentiary showings on the
strength of the duty of client loyalty. That duty, she insists, tolerates law-
yer-inflicted moral injury to client racial identity and community, regard-
less of narrative source and content.
22
Contrary to Barnes's view, the convergence of race, law, and lan-
guage in criminal defense advocacy warrants a political defense of racial-
18. See id. at 791-93.
19. See id. at 792.
20. See id. at 793.
21. On the interpretive collapse of "individual personalities" into "collective subjects"
under the rubric of race, see Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of
Reconstruction, 82 Cal. L Rev. 741, 762 (1994) ("The study of racism is in part a study of
how individual personalities are melted down into collective subjects.").
22. See Barnes, supra note 4, at 794.
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ized strategies within the ambit of zealous advocacy. Consider, for exam-
ple, an anti-subordination theory or politics of legal advocacy. Criminal
defense advocates might argue that certain racially motivated acts of
black-on-white violence constitute legitimate political acts deserving of
protection. Alternatively, they might contend that racially motivated vio-
lence comprises a form of self-defense or that race-infected rage fur-
nishes a legal excuse for such violence. But Barnes eschews an explicit
politics of racial representation in favor of the adversarial system excuse
of the best available criminal defense.23 The best defense claim is bound
up in the ethical charge of zealous advocacy. Adhering to this color-blind
decree, Barnes contends that the ethic of race-conscious responsibility
presumes too much about the detrimental nature and sociolegal origins
of racial injury. The ethic, she remarks, overstates assessments of the
damaging effects of lawyers' use of racialized narratives.
24
To be sure, the alternative ethic of race-conscious responsibility op-
poses the accepted obligations of criminal defense practice, including the
race-neutral pretense of zealous advocacy. The ethic meets this challenge
by seeking to enlarge the notions of lawyer duty, client or third party
injury, and causal responsibility integral to advocacy. Efforts to stabilize
these categories merely produce discontinuity and fracture. Ethics schol-
ars reveal this discontinuity in the lawyer's duty to offer nonlegal advice
on issues of moral character 25 and community interest. 26 CRT scholars
demonstrate the malleability of racial identity27 and the multiple physical
and psychosocial aspects of racial injury.28 Feminist scholars point to the
ambiguity of causal attribution in fact finding.29 The mutability of these
23. See id. at 794-95.
24. See id. at 789-90.
25. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 Yale L.J. 1545, 1549, 1607, 1609 (1995)
(proposing a "counselor-lawyer" ethics of dialogue, character, and virtue guided by a
"presumptive moral obligation to engage in a counseling conversation if there is reason to
foresee that the client may violate the law or a significant legal or moral norm").
26. See Bill 0. Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty
To Work for the Common Good, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 930 (1995) (recommending
community-lawyer ethic of "racial harmony" to resolve conflicts involving different racial
and ethnic groups).
27. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur. Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent
Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 781, 783 (1994) (discussing
criminal defense attorneys' construction of race in deploying race-based claims of
reasonableness in self-defense cases).
28. Cf. Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 Yale LJ. 1559, 1570 (1989)
(describing cognitive, microaggressive acts conveying the "social message of inferiority and
subordination") and John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation:
"Hewing a Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair," 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1233, 1235-36
(1995) (employing the concept of "racialized space" to link the dynamics of residential
location, community, and racial identity).
29. See Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and
Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 36,
[Vol. 96:800
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concepts makes clear that a lawyer's duty is not fixed and may be ex-
panded to meet the demands of a particular context.
Notwithstanding the instability of the core categories of criminal de-
fense ethics, Barnes protests that the ethic of race-conscious responsibil-
ity runs counter to "the lawyer's duty to act solely in the interests of indi-
vidual clients."30 Acknowledging that this duty may sometimes require
the use of "racialized narratives," Barnes persists that race-based narra-
tives are "clearly permit[ted]" by ethical rules.8 ' Regulatory encroach-
ment on these boundaries, Barnes comments, is likely to "wind up on a
collision course with principles underlying the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution."
32
Barnes's remonstrations overlook the basic incoherence of the "best
interest" standard. Coherent exercise of a lawyer's best interest discre-
tion requires a fixed account of client identity, an ability to discern client
values and interests, and a willingness to justify normative judgments in-
dependent of client preference. Barnes's proffered analysis meets none
of these requirements. The analysis lacks a meaningful account of client
identity outside the assertion of a narrow liberty interest. It also neglects
scrutiny of lawyer epistemology, interpretation, and morality, leaving dis-
cretionary normative judgments unguided.
Barnes's suggestion that client social identity lies stuck33 in media-
driven racial artifice provides little principled justification for discretion-
ary appeals to race-based prejudice through the exploitation of racialized
narratives beyond the practical exigencies of circumstance. 34 Although
attractive, the claim of exigent circumstance amounts to a basic restate-
ment of her prior liberty interest argument. Absent a reasoned justifica-
tion for the privileging of this interest over all other competing interests,
including the demonstration that liberty survives unharmed by injuries to
dignity and community, Barnes's analysis founders. It invokes lawyer duty
but hastily cabins the scope of that duty. It acknowledges client injury but
discounts the significance of that injury. And it denies a law-related nar-
rative cause of harm but traces the line of causation to mixed sociological
narrative.
Barnes's analysis falters as well in broaching the contention that ethi-
cal regulation of race-based narratives casts an impermissible restriction
on the First Amendment liberties of lawyers and clients. That contention
ignores the broad history of speech regulation in civil and criminal advo-
cacy. This regulatory history encompasses restrictions on claims deemed
98 (1995) (pointing out that cultural defense arguments muddy issues of causation and
responsibility).
30. Barnes, supra note 4, at 793.
31. Id. at 793-94.
32. Id. at 790.
33. See id. at 792.
34. See id. at 792-94, 796.
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frivolous,3 5 prejudicial,3 6 and false,3 7 as well as claims presented in bad
faith.38 Further restrictions flow from judge-made doctrinal bars to prof-
fered defenses in cases of avowed political protest.3 9 In addition to this
regulatory and prudential history of speech restriction, the CRT-forged
doctrine of hate speech presents a potential substantive basis for regula-
tion, provided courts construe racialized narratives as a form of hate
speech.40
Barnes's rejection of alternative speech regulation and her tolerance
of essentialist narratives contravenes the recent effort of CRT scholars to
define racial identity as subjective and pluralist, and, further, to decenter
the universal racial subject as a moral agent isolated from her commu-
nity. Applied to the context of criminal defense advocacy, this effort
harbors both theoretical and practical import. Indeed, unless criminal
defense advocates construe racial identity in multi-faceted terms and link
clients to community contexts, they risk reenacting racial essentialism
and collective stigma. They also risk a revival of the metaphysics of
neutrality.
Barnes's critique promotes a liberal metaphysics of race-neutral eth-
ics and lawyering, hindering the development of a theory of the racialized
subject situated at the intersection of competing narratives, and limiting
the possibility of transformative self-construction based on a concept of
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1995) (permitting court dismissal of frivolous in forma
pauperis actions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) (requiring attorney certification that
contentions are warranted by nonfrivolous argument); Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 3.1 (1994) (barring claims or contentions where basis is frivolous); Model
Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-4 (1980) (a lawyer may not bring a claim unless
there is a basis that is not "frivolous").
36. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (allowing exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
"unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury"); Fed. R. Evid. 404
(generally "[e]xcluding evidence of a person's character or a trait of character for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion"); ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice Standard 4-7.7(c) (1992) (prohibiting "arguments
calculated to appeal to the prejudices of the jury"); see also Fed. R. Evid. 412 (excluding
evidence of alleged predisposition of rape victim).
37. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(1), (4) (1994) (false
statements of material fact or offers of evidence); Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 7-102 (A) (4)-(5) (1980) (false evidence or statements of fact).
38. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (1994) (requiring good faith
argument); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-4 (1980) (same).
39. See James L. Cavallaro, Jr., Casenote, The Demise of the Political Necessity
Defense: Indirect Civil Disobedience and United States v. Schoon, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 351,
354-56 (1993) (explaining judge-made doctrinal obstacles to the assertion of necessity
defense in cases of civil disobedience); Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine in
Politically Sensitive Cases: Silencing the Defendant at Trial, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1271, 1272
(1987) (discussing the prosecutorial use of in limine motions to preclude defenses in both
criminal and politically sensitive trials).
40. For an exposition of the substantive basis and regulatory function of hate speech,
see MariJ. Matsuda et al., Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and
the First Amendment (1993).
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dual or multiple consciousness. 4' Equally important, her disavowal of in-
terpretive possibilities to promote justice42 treats the repression of hierar-
chical dualities-deviance and defiance-as a matter of rhetorical form
rather than substance and, thereby, trivializes the legal experience of ra-
cial subordination. A call for an end to race-talk-even the color-coded
rhetoric of well-intentioned criminal defense advocates-is neither a call
for neutrality, truth, nor injustice. Instead, it is a call for racial
responsibility.
41. See Ian F.H. Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 61 (1994) (noting that race
and identity "are relationally tied to one another across the unstable medium of
communities").
42. See Barnes, supra note 4, at 792-93.
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